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courts on the compatibility of the Dublin Regulation with the fundamental rights 
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different approaches concerning EU Member States' obligations under the Dublin 
Regulation. On the other, it argues that an irreconcilable interpretation of the 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The recent judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in 
Tarakhel v. Switzerland1 offers a pretext for reconsidering whether the EU 
Dublin regulation complies with the protection of fundamental rights. 
This regulation establishes a hierarchy of criteria in order to identify a 
single Member State responsible for the examination of an asylum claim 
lodged by a third-country national. The Tarakhel case is not the first time 
that these criteria have fallen under judicial scrutiny. In the M.S.S.2 and 
N.S.3 cases, both from 2011, the ECtHR and the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU), respectively, considered whether the returns to 
Greece implemented by the Member States on the basis of the Dublin 
regulation complied with the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) and the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(EUCFR). Following these landmark cases, a high degree of inconsistency 
has affected the dialogue between these two Courts. Although the EU 
legislator4 seems to have endorsed the principles laid down in M.S.S., the 
CJEU appears to have developed an autonomous interpretation of the 
regulation. This dialogue is likely to be further affected by the recent 
Opinion 2/2013 of the CJEU, concerning the accession of the EU to the 
ECHR.5  
 
The Dublin regulation is grounded on the presumption that all EU 
Member States, as well as the States bound by its provisions on the basis of 
bilateral agreements,6 observe the fundamental rights of the European 
Union. Although in agreement with the relative character of this 
presumption, the jurisprudence of the European Courts diverges over the 
conditions that might rebut the 'mutual trust' between Member States. 
Furthermore, a first glance at the case law might suggest that the ECtHR 
and the CJEU also infer different consequences from the exclusion of such 
presumption. Clearly, when a State does not respect or ensure the 
fundamental rights enshrined in Articles 3 ECHR and 4 EUCFR,7 other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Tarakhel v. Switzerland App no 29217/12 (ECtHR, 4 November 2014).  
2 M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece App no 30696/09 (ECtHR, 21 January 2011). 
3 Case C-411/10 and 493/10 N.S. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department and M.E. 
and others v. Refugee Applications Commissioner, Minister for Justice, Equality and Law 
Reform ECLI:EU:C:2011:865. 
4 The Preamble of the recast Dublin III Regulation (n 10) reads as follows: '[w]ith 
respect to the treatment of persons falling within the scope of this Regulation, 
Member States are bound by their obligations under instruments of international 
law, including the relevant case-law of the European Court of Human Rights.' 
5 Opinion 2/2013 on the Accession of European Union to the European Convention 
for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 18 December 
2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454. 
6 Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland, that have associated themselves 
with the EU regime on the abolition of border controls (the Schengen agreements). 
7 These provisions prohibit torture and other inhuman and degrading treatment. As 
pointed out by Ippolito, in N.S. the CJEU failed to say 'whether violations of 
fundamental rights other than in Article 4 may be sufficient to avoid a 
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Member States cannot safely return an asylum seeker to its territory.8 The 
return cannot be executed even though the Dublin regulation designates 
such State as the only Member State competent to assess his/her asylum 
claim. Even if both the ECtHR and the CJEU share this view, there seems 
to be no common and clear understanding on how the Member States, 
having jurisdiction over an asylum seeker that cannot be returned to the 
competent State, ought to behave in such cases.  
 
Following an introductory overview on the evolution of the Dublin 
Regulation and its role within the Common European Asylum System, this 
paper analyses the shortcomings, which have attracted scrutiny of the 
European Courts. 
 
This paper then argues that there is little room to reconcile the 
interpretative approach adopted by the EU judges on the conditions to 
overcome the mutual trust principle with Strasbourg jurisprudence on 
Article 3 of the ECHR. Indeed, the interpretative approach adopted by 
the CJEU is inconsistent with Articles 52(3) and 53 of the EUCFR. These 
Articles provide that the Charter provisions corresponding to ECHR 
provisions must be given the same meaning and scope as the rights laid 
down by the Convention and that nothing in the Charter shall be 
interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human rights and 
fundamental freedoms as recognized, inter alia, in the ECHR. 
 
The situation is rather different when it comes to the consequences 
deriving from the rebuttal of the compliance presumption. It is argued 
that the statements of the two European Courts can be read as providing a 
set of non-conflicting obligations that Member States must fulfill when a 
return to the Competent State under the Dublin regulation cannot be 
executed. On the one hand, the obligations imposed by the CJEU are not 
in breach of the Convention provisions; on the other, the mechanism of 
diplomatic assurances recently suggested by the ECtHR in Tarackel, 
though apparently incompatible with the mutual trust principle, might 
turn out to be a workable path for preserving the functioning of the 
Dublin Regulation by simultaneously granting the respect of fundamental 
rights.  
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
transfer/referral pursuant to the criteria of the Dublin II Regulation'; Francesca 
Ippolito, 'Migration and Asylum Cases before the Court of Justice of the European 
Union: Putting the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights to Test?' (2015) 17 European 
Journal of Migration and Law 1, 24.  
8 Indeed, arts 3 ECHR and 4 EUCFR are commonly interpreted as implicitly 
enshrining the principle of non-refoulement, according to which an individual cannot 
be returned to a territory where his life and freedom are endangered.  
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II.  THE DUBLIN REGULATION AND THE COMMON EUROPEAN 
ASYLUM SYSTEM 
 
The Council Regulation No. 343/2003 of 18 February 2003, establishing the 
criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for 
examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a 
third-country national (Dublin II)9 has recently been replaced by 
Regulation No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
(Dublin III).10 Indeed, the EU legal instruments on asylum have been 
reformed between 2011 and 2013. The reformed legislation finds its legal 
basis in Article 78 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU)11 and is articulated in the Common European Asylum 
System (CEAS).  
 
Besides the distribution of competence for examining asylum claims 
between the Member States,12 the CEAS regulates the reception of asylum 
seekers (Reception Directive),13 the procedures for obtaining the 
international protection (Procedures Directive),14 as well as the conditions 
and the content of this protection (Qualification Directive).15   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Council Regulation 343/2003 [2004] OJ L50/1. The first paragraph of art 78 TFEU 
reads as follows: 'The Union shall develop a common policy on asylum, subsidiary 
protection and temporary protection with a view to offering appropriate status to 
any third-country national requiring international protection and ensuring 
compliance with the principle of non-refoulement. This policy must be in accordance 
with the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 
relating to the status of refugees, and other relevant treaties.'  
10 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 
June 2013 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member 
State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in 
one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person (recast) 
[2013] OJ L180/31. 
11 This provision corresponds to former art 63 of the Treaty on the European 
Community.   
12 The Dublin regulation is completed by Regulation No 603/2013 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on the establishment of 'Eurodac' for 
the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of Regulation (EU) No 
604/2013 and on requests for the comparison with Eurodac data by Member States' 
law enforcement authorities and Europol for law enforcement purposes, and 
amending Regulation (EU) No 1077/2011 establishing a European Agency for the 
operational management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security 
and justice (recast) [2013] OJ L180/1.  
13 Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 26 June 2013 
laying down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection 
(recast) [2013] OJ L180/96. 
14 Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 
2013 on common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection 
(recast) [2013] OJ L180/60. 
15 Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or 
stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for 
refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the content of the 
protection granted (recast) [2011] OJ L337/9. The CEAS is further completed by the 
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With the recent reform, the CEAS has entered its so-called 'second 
phase'16 aimed at the harmonization of the EU asylum policy. The recast 
instruments are now being implemented in the Member States and it is 
certainly too early to estimate the effects of their application. The term for 
the transposition of the directives has expired only a few months ago, the 
only exception being the Qualification Directive, which had to be 
transposed by 21 December 2013.17 Nevertheless, even a superficial reading 
of the recast provisions dampens any optimism regarding eventual 
harmonization. The new legislation, reproducing as it does the minimum 
standards scheme, continues to leave a high margin of discretion to the 
Member States.   
 
The harmonization of national asylum legislations ought to be a 
precondition for the Dublin criteria and mechanisms to work fairly and 
efficiently. The Dublin Regulation, in fact, leaves asylum seekers bereft of 
any choice concerning the country where they can lodge their claim. There 
is a single State competent for examining an asylum application18 and this 
State is identified on the basis of objective and hierarchical criteria set 
forth in the Regulation.19 This mechanism means that the asylum seeker 
cannot lodge an application in a different Member State, even when 
his/her claim is rejected by the competent State (this is the so-called 'one 
chance rule'). Given the lack of uniform standards of protection within the 
Member States, the Dublin system entails rather unfair treatment for 
asylum seekers.20 The reception conditions and the chances of being 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Council Directive 2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving 
temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on 
measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such 
persons and bearing the consequences thereof (Temporary Protection Directive) 
[2001] OJ L212/12. This Directive was not triggered by the recent reform.  
16 This second phase was originally conceived by the Hague Program, adopted by the 
European Council in 2004.  
17 Art 39 of the Recast Qualification Directive of 2011.  
18 'The application shall be examined by a single Member State, which shall be the 
one which the criteria set out in Chapter III indicate is responsible' (Dublin III 
Regulation, art 3(1)). 
19 The criteria are to be applied in the order in which they are presented in the 
Regulation and on the basis of the situation existing when the asylum seeker first 
lodged his/her application with a Member State (Dublin III Regulation, art 7). 
Firstly, the Regulation set forth the criteria applicable to minor asylum seekers and 
other criteria based on the principle of family unity, applicable to all applicants 
whose family members reside in the EU territory (arts 8-11). Secondly, the Dublin 
criteria indicate as State competent the Member State which issued a residence 
document or a visa to the applicant (art 12). Thirdly, the Regulation gives relevance 
to the (legal or illegal) entry or stay in the EU territory (art 13).  
20 Interestingly, Evelien Brouwer argues that, in cases in which the mutual trust 
principle is not in the interest of the individuals, a '(higher level of the) 
harmonization of law is necessary' ('Mutual Trust and the Dublin Regulation: 
Protection of Fundamental Rights in the EU and the Burden of Proof' (2013) 9 
Utrecht Law Review 135, 136-137). This assumption might apply, for instance, to the 
Dublin System and the European Arrest Warrant, both implying a risk of violation of 
art 3 ECHR.  
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granted international protection vary considerably depending on which 
State is elected as competent by the Regulation criteria. 
 
The unfairness towards asylum seekers is not the only reason why the 
Dublin Regulation has been criticized. As a matter of fact, its unfairness 
extends to the Member States. Despite representing a residuary criterion 
within the hierarchy set forth by the Regulation, the provision most 
commonly applied to determine the State competent is Article 10. This 
provision links irregular entry to the responsibility for the examination of 
an asylum claim: 'where it is established […] that an asylum seeker has 
irregularly crossed the border into a Member State by land, sea or air 
having come from a third country, the Member State thus entered shall be 
responsible for examining the application for asylum.'21 This criterion 
clearly penalizes the Member States on the external borders of the 
European Union, especially the Mediterranean States.22 Hence, the Dublin 
Regulation is also criticized for not being compatible with the principle of 
solidarity, included by the Lisbon Treaty in Article 80 TFEU.23  
 
The feature of the Dublin criteria and mechanisms, which attracted the 
scrutiny of the European Courts, is their foundation on the principle of 
mutual trust.24 As mentioned above, the whole system is grounded on the 
presumption that all the Member States and the States bound by the 
regulation by virtue of bilateral agreements25 observe EU law, particularly 
EU fundamental rights and freedoms.26 On the basis of this presumption, 
the Member States consider themselves reciprocally as ‘safe countries’.27 
 
The presumption of compliance covers the principle of non-refoulement28 set 
forth by the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Refugee Status,29 the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Dublin III Regulation, art 13(1) (former art 10(1) of Dublin II). 
22 Eiko Thielemann, 'Why Asylum Policy Harmonization Undermines Refugee 
Burden-Sharing' (2004) 6 European Journal of Migration and Law 47, 58; Maria-
Teresa Gil-Bazo 'The Practice of Mediterranean States in the context of the 
European Union's Justice and Home Affairs External Dimension. The Safe Third 
Country Concept Revisited' (2006) 18 International Journal of Refugee Law 571, 578. 
23 See inter alia Roland Bieber, Francesco Maiani, 'Sans solidarité point d'Union 
européenne : Regards croisés sur les crises de l'Union  économique et monétaire et 
du Système européen commun d'asile' (2012) 2 Revue Trimestrielle de Droit 
Européen 295.  
24 Satvinder S. Juss argues that the Dublin system is 'still anchored in the mind-set of 
colonial Europe. It assumes that every area in Europe - from Sicily in the south to 
Scandinavia in the north - is a safe territory for a refugee to access protection once he 
or she gets there'; 'The Post-Colonial Refugee, Dublin II, and the end of non-
refoulement' (2013) 20 International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, 310.  
25 Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland, that have associated themselves 
with the EU regime on the abolition of border controls (the Schengen agreements).  
26 Case C-411/10 and 493/10 (n 3), para 83. 
27 The same presumption justifies Protocol 24 on asylum for nationals of Member 
States of the European Union, attached to the TFEU. 
28 The third Recital of the Recast Regulation Preamble reads as follows: 'Member 
States, all respecting the principle of non-refoulement, are considered as safe countries 
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European Convention on Human Rights and the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. 
 
III. SYSTEMIC FAILURES: THE TENSION BETWEEN MUTUAL 
TRUST AND THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
 
The question of the judicial dialogue between the European Courts is at 
the core of a very lively debate concerning Opinion 2/2013 of the CJEU on 
the accession of the European Union to the ECHR.30 Although this first 
attempt to formalize the relationship between the Strasbourg and the 
Luxembourg Courts failed,31 the jurisprudence of the two Courts continues 
to interact in a number of fields32 and this interaction is partially regulated 
by EU law provisions. 
 
According to the EU Court of Justice, the European Convention on 
Human Rights has a ‘special significance’ within the EU legal order.33 This 
special significance has been codified by Article 6 of the Treaty on the 
European Union (TEU), according to which 'fundamental rights, as 
guaranteed by the [ECHR] and as they result from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general 
principles of the Union’s law.'  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
for third country nationals.' The whole European asylum policy is bound by the 
respect of this principle by virtue of art 78 TFEU.  
29 Nevertheless, the non-refoulement principle proclaimed by art 33 of the Geneva 
Convention differs from the ones elaborated within the Council of Europe and the 
EU for two main reasons. Firstly, its application only protects the 'refugee' from 
being returned 'to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion.' It is not contended that such protection equally 
extends to asylum seekers. Nevertheless, the need for the threat to be motivated by 
one of the conventional grounds considerably diminishes the extent of the 
protection against expulsion. Secondly, unlike art 3 ECHR, art 33 does not proclaim 
an absolute principle of non-refoulement. The same provision provides an exception to 
its application in the second paragraph: '[t]he benefit of the present provision may 
not, however, be claimed by a refugee whom there are reasonable grounds for 
regarding as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having 
been convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a 
danger to the community of that country.' 
30 Opinion 2/2013 on the Accession of European Union to the European Convention 
for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 18 December 
2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454.  
31 The Opinion delivered by the CJEU has declared the Draft Convention on the 
Accession of the EU to the ECHR incompatible with the EU founding Treaties. 
32 Specifically on the interaction of the two Courts in the field of immigration and 
asylum Sonia Morano-Foadi and Stelios Andreadakis, 'The Convergence of the 
European Legal System in the Treatment of Third Country Nationals in Europe: The 
ECJ and ECtHR Jurisprudence' (2011) 22 European Journal of International Law 
1071.   
33 Case C-402/05 and C-415/05, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council 
and Commission [2005] ECLI:EU:T:2005:332, para 283. 
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Moreover, Articles 52 and 53 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
regulate the articulation of this Charter with the ECHR. Article 52(3) 
provides that the Charter provisions corresponding to ECHR provisions 
must be given the same meaning and scope of the rights laid down by the 
Convention, without preventing EU law from granting more extensive 
protection. According to Article 53, 'nothing in [the] Charter shall be 
interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human rights and 
fundamental freedoms as recognized, in their respective fields of 
application, by Union law and international law and by international 
agreements to which the Union, the Community or all the Member States 
are party, including the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.'  
 
This paper addresses one of most challenging inconsistencies between the 
two European courts' jurisprudence. Both the ECtHR and the CJEU have 
delivered judgments on the compatibility of the Dublin Regulation with 
the fundamental rights enshrined, respectively, in the ECHR and the 
EUCFR. This section outlines the principles and statements emerging 
from these judgments. The two courts share the view that the mutual trust 
presumption, on which the Dublin Regulation is based, must be rebuttable 
in order to ensure that asylum seekers are not returned to territories in 
which they would face inhuman and degrading treatment. The threshold to 
rebut this presumption is, nonetheless, different in the ECtHR and the 
CJEU case law. While the first Court gives relevance to the individual risk 
the asylum seeker would face if returned to the State competent according 
to Dublin criteria, the second focuses on the general situation of the 
national reception system and establishes a higher threshold to rebut the 
mutual trust presumption. This higher threshold, clearly aimed at 
preserving the mutual trust principle, is only met when a Member State 
asylum system suffers from 'systemic failures'. Following a detailed analysis 
of the case law, this section argues that the restrictive interpretation 
proposed by the CJEU is not compatible with the clauses set forth in 
Articles 52 and 53 of the Charter. 
 
1. The Dublin Regulation and Non-Refoulement: The M.S.S. Case of the 
ECtHR 
The right of asylum is not explicitly protected by the European 
Convention on Human Rights. Nonetheless, in a number of decisions the 
ECtHR has applied Articles 3 (prohibition of torture), 5 (right to liberty 
and security), 8 (right to respect for private and family life) and 13 (right to 
an effective remedy) in order to grant substantial protection to asylum 
seekers. As a matter of fact, the Strasbourg judges recognize the peculiar 
status of these applicants as members of a ‘particularly underprivileged and 
vulnerable population group in need of special protection.'34 Hence, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 M.S.S. (n 2) para 251. 
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Court acts in practice as an 'asylum court'35 despite the lack of a specific 
legal basis in the provisions of the Convention.  
 
The cornerstone of the protection granted to asylum seekers is 
undoubtedly Article 3 of the Convention. The ECtHR has constantly 
inferred from Article 3 the principle of non-refoulement. According to the 
well-known formula elaborated by the Court, the decision by a 
Contracting State to expel an individual 'may give rise to an issue under 
Article 3, and, hence, engage the responsibility of that State under the 
Convention, where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that 
the person concerned, if expelled, faces a real risk of being subjected to 
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the 
receiving country.'36 The principle of non-refoulement deriving from Article 3 
has an absolute character37 and offers an additional protection against 
indirect refoulement,38 i.e. against the expulsion to the territory of a State 
from which there is the risk that the person would be further expelled and 
exposed to inhuman or degrading treatment in a third country.   
 
The principle of non-refoulement elaborated by the Strasbourg Court 
extends its effect to the field of application of the Dublin Regulation. The 
Grand Chamber of the ECtHR, in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, has 
partially 'dismantled'39 the competence-sharing system created by the 
Dublin II Regulation. Belgium has been condemned for a violation of 
Articles 3 and 13 of the Convention. By returning the applicant to Greece, 
Belgium exposed him to widespread inhuman and degrading treatment 
caused by the insufficiency of the Greek reception system. Moreover, the 
applicant faced the risk of being further repatriated from Greece to his 
country of origin, given the documented practice of the Greek authorities 
to return asylum seekers without granting them access to a fair asylum 
procedure.40 According to the Court, Belgium thus violated the principle 
of non-refoulement both directly and indirectly.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Marc Bossuyt, 'The Court of Strasbourg Acting as an Asylum Court' (2012) 8 
European Constitutional Law Review 203.    
36 Soering v. United Kingdom App no 14038/88 (ECtHR, 7 July 1989), para. 91; Cruz 
Varas v. Sweden App no 15576/89 (ECtHR, 20 March 1991), para 69; Vilvarajah v. 
United Kingdom App no 13163/87 (ECtHR, 30 October 1991), para 103; Ahmed v. 
Austria App no 25964/94 (ECtHR, 17 December 1996), para 39. 
37 Saadi v. Italy App no 37201/06 (ECtHR, 28 February 2008), para 127.  
38 T.I. v. UK App no 43844/98 (ECtHR, 7 March 2000); for a more recent judgment 
see Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy App no 27765/09, (ECtHR, 23 February 2012), para 
146. 
39 Violeta Moreno-Lax, 'Dismantling the Dublin System: M.S.S. v. Belgium and 
Greece' (2012) 14 European Journal of Migration and Law 1. 
40 The findings of the Court concerning the Greek international protection system 
have been recently reconfirmed in Sharifi and others v. Italy App. no 16643/09 
(ECtHR, 21 October 2014).  
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Interestingly, in this case the Court departed from its statements in 
Bosphorus,41 according to which the Dublin Regulation could have escaped 
from Strasbourg judicial review. By returning the applicant to Greece, 
Belgium had acted in accordance with a European Union Regulation. In 
principle, this could suffice for the equivalent protection presumption to 
apply and hence to exclude the competence of the ECtHR. Nonetheless, 
Article 3(2) of the Dublin II Regulation42 provided a 'sovereignty clause' 
according to which 'each Member State may decide to examine an 
application for international protection lodged with it by a third-country 
national or a stateless person, even if such examination is not its 
responsibility under the criteria laid down in [the] Regulation.' According 
to the Strasbourg Court, the discretion left to the States, which may 
refrain from transferring the applicants, renders the Bosphorus presumption 
inapplicable to the case of Dublin transferals. Such transferals, in fact, do 
not strictly fall within the State international legal obligations.43  
 
2. The CJEU Jurisprudence on the Dublin Regulation: The Systemic Failures 
Criterion   
As noted above, the principle of mutual trust between the EU Member 
States underlies the criteria and mechanisms established by the Dublin 
Regulation. According to the CJEU, this principle is fundamentally 
important in EU Law, as it allows the creation and the maintenance of an 
area without internal borders. This mutual trust principle requires 
Member States to assume that all other Member States respect EU law 
and particularly the fundamental rights recognized by EU law. The CJEU 
agrees with the ECtHR that this presumption must be relative. 
Nonetheless, it has set a higher threshold to rebut the compliance 
presumption in order to protect the EU principle of mutual trust.  
 
As a matter of fact, the CJEU reacted to the 'external' evaluation of the 
Dublin Regulation by the ECtHR a few months after the M.S.S. judgment. 
In the N.S. case,44 the CJEU takes note of the principles laid down in 
M.S.S.45 and follows the path traced by the Strasbourg Court by claiming 
that the presumption of compliance with the fundamental rights of the 
European Union, on which the Dublin Regulation is based, cannot be 
absolute.46 An absolute presumption would be incompatible with the law 
of the European Union47 and with the obligation to interpret the Dublin 
Regulation in accordance with fundamental rights.48 In fact, according to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41 Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland App. no 45036/98 
(ECtHR, 30 June 2005), paras 152-165. The Netherlands, third intervening State in 
M.S., objected to the competence of the Court on the basis of the equivalent 
protection principle (para 330 of the judgment).  
42 This provision corresponds to what is today art 17(1) of the Dublin III Regulation.  
43 M.S.S (n 2), paras 339-340. Similarly, Tarakhel (n 1), paras 88-91.  
44 N.S. (n 3). 
45 ibid, paras 88-90. 
46 ibid, para 104.  
47 ibid, para 105. 
48 ibid, para 99. 
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the CJEU, Article 4 of the EUCFR49 'must be interpreted as meaning that 
the Member States, including the national courts, may not transfer an 
asylum seeker to the "Member State responsible" within the meaning of 
Regulation No 343/2003 where they cannot be unaware that systemic 
deficiencies in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions of 
asylum seekers in that Member State amount to substantial grounds for 
believing that the asylum seeker would face a real risk of being subjected to 
inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of that provision.'50 
 
As an institution of the European Union, the Luxembourg Court obviously 
aims to preserve the functioning of the Dublin system. According to the 
CJEU, not any infringements of the European asylum legislation can 
overcome the presumption of compliance underlying the Dublin 
Regulation.51 Only the presence of major operational problems52 can 
impede the regular implementation of the competence-sharing system. 
The threshold established by the Court is reached when the State 
responsible suffers from 'systemic flaws in the asylum procedure and 
reception conditions for asylum […], resulting in inhuman or degrading 
treatment, within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter, of asylum 
seekers transferred to the territory of that Member State.'53  
 
The subsequent case law of the CJEU progressively complicated the 
dialogue with the ECtHR. According to the CJEU's judgment in 
Abdullahi, an asylum seeker can challenge the identification of the 
Member State competent, resulting from the criteria set forth by the 
Regulation, only 'by pleading systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure 
and in the conditions for the reception of applicants for asylum in that 
Member State.'54 Therefore, the assessment of the applicant's individual 
risk is neither necessary nor sufficient to rebut the mutual trust 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 This provision proclaims the prohibition of torture and other inhuman and 
degrading treatment. According to art 52(3) of the Charter, the Luxembourg Court 
confers to such provision the same meaning and scope as art 3 ECHR.  
50 N.S. (n 3), para 106 (emphasis added). 
51 ibid, para 85: 'if the mandatory consequence of any infringement of the individual 
provisions of Directives 2003/9, 2004/83 or 2005/85 by the Member State responsible 
were that the Member State in which the asylum application was lodged is precluded 
from transferring the applicant to the first mentioned State, that would add to the 
criteria for determining the Member State responsible set out in Chapter III of 
Regulation No 343/2003 another exclusionary criterion according to which minor 
infringements of the abovementioned directives committed in a certain Member 
State may exempt that Member State from the obligations provided for under 
Regulation No 343/2003. Such a result would deprive those obligations of their 
substance and endanger the realization of the objective of quickly designating the 
Member State responsible for examining an asylum claim lodged in the European 
Union.' 
52 ibid, para 81.  
53 ibid, para 86.  
54 Case C-394/12 Abdullahi c. Bundesasylamt [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:813, para 62.  
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presumption and to suspend the transferals under the Dublin Regulation.55 
The CJEU has established 'a high barrier against the setting aside of the 
principle of mutual trust'56 in order to ensure the capability of the 
Regulation to serve its primary objectives, which is 'to organize 
responsibilities among the Member States, ensure speed in the processing 
of asylum applications57 and prevent forum shopping58'.59 
 
In a number of decisions preceding the Tarakhel judgment, the ECtHR 
acknowledged and indeed seemed to approve the 'systemic failures' 
criterion. The Strasbourg Court, in fact, has declared manifestly ill-
founded (in a rather systematic way60) the applications of asylum seekers 
who had been repatriated or were about to be repatriated to Italy by virtue 
of the Dublin Regulation. Though taking into account, in principle, the 
individual circumstances of the applicants, the Court rejected their 
applications with a stereotyped formula which borrows the terms used by 
the CJEU: 'while the general situation and living conditions in Italy of 
asylum seekers, accepted refugees and aliens who have been granted a 
residence permit for international protection or humanitarian purposes 
may disclose some shortcomings […], it has not been shown to disclose a systemic 
failure to provide support or facilities catering for asylum seekers as 
members of a particularly vulnerable group of people, as was the case in 
M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece.'61   
 
In this complicated judicial dialogue, the Tarakhel judgment has definitely 
shed light on the position of the Strasbourg Court. The latter Court has 
refused to acknowledge the systematic failures criterion by instead 
emphasizing the relevance of the applicant's individual situation.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 'As the exceptional situation as described in N.S. does not relate to the 
characteristics of an individual asylum seeker, Member States are obliged to take 
exceptional situations into account on a general basis and not as a matter of evidence 
provided within the context of assessing the admissibility of an individual 
application.' Opinion of AG Jääskinen in Case C-4/14, Bundesrepublik Deutschland v. 
Kaveh Puid [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:244, para 23.  
56 ibid, para 62.  
57 Recital 4 of the Dublin II Regulation. See also Case C‑245/11 K v Bundesasylamt 
[2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:685, para 48. 
58 Opinion of AG Trstenjak in N.S. (n 3), para 94. 
59 Opinion of AG Jääskinen, in Puid (n 55), para 62. 
60 Maura Marchegiani, 'Il Sistema di Dublino Ancora al Centro del Confronto tra 
Corti in Europa: Carenze Sistemiche, Problemi Connessi alle 'Capacità Attuali del 
Sistema di Accoglienza' e Rilievo delle Garanzie Individuali nella Sentenza Tarakhel 
C. Svizzera' (2014) 5 Ordine Internazionale e Diritti Umani 1113. 
61 Mohammed and others v. the Netherlands and Italy, App no 40524/10 (ECtHR, 27 
August 2013), para 78 (emphasis added). See further Abubeker v. Austria and Italy App 
no 73874/11 (ECtHR, 18 June 2013); Halimi v. Austria and Italy App no 53852/11, 
(ECtHR, 18 June 2013); Miruts Hagos v. The Netherlands and Italy App no 9053/10 
(ECtHR, 27 August 2013);  Hussein Diirshi and others v. the Netherlands and Italy App 
no 2314/10 (ECtHR, 10 September 2013). 
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3. The ECtHR Emphasizing the Relevance of an Individual Assessment in 
Tarakhel 
The Tarakhel judgment concerned a family of Afghan nationals who had 
lodged a protection claim in Switzerland. This State, which is bound by the 
Regulation by virtue of a bilateral agreement with the EU,62 intended to 
repatriate the applicants in Italy, where they had first been identified.63 
The Court acknowledged that the situation in Italy was rather different to 
the one found in Greece in the case M.S.S.64 The Italian protection 
system, unlike the Greek one,65 did not present systemic failures. This 
difference led the Court to adopt a different approach.66 In the absence of 
generalized and documented violations, the ECtHR has deemed it 
necessary to assess the individual risk that the applicants would face if 
expelled to Italy, the competent State under the Dublin Regulation. As a 
matter of fact, it has been acknowledged that 'while the structure and 
overall situation of the reception arrangements in Italy cannot […] in 
themselves act as a bar to all removals of asylum seekers to that country, 
the data and information [considered] nevertheless raise serious doubts as 
to the current capacities of the system.'67 Accordingly, in the Court's view, 
'the possibility that a significant number of asylum seekers removed to that 
country may be left without accommodation or accommodated in 
overcrowded facilities without any privacy, or even in insalubrious or 
violent conditions, is not unfounded.'68  
 
According to the well-established case-law of the ECtHR, 'to fall within 
the scope of Article 3 the ill-treatment must attain a minimum level of 
severity. The assessment of this minimum is relative; it depends on all the 
circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment and its 
physical or mental effects and, in some instances, the sex, age and state of 
health of the victim.'69 While not implying an obligation to provide the 
asylum seeker with a house70 or financial assistance,71 the obligation of a 
contracting State under Article 3 ECHR is engaged 'in respect of 
treatment where an applicant, who [is] wholly dependent on State support, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Association agreement of 26 October 2004 between the Swiss Confederation and 
the European Community regarding criteria and mechanisms for establishing the 
State responsible for examining a request for asylum lodged in a Member State or in 
Switzerland (OJ L 53 of 27 February 2008).  
63 Italy was therefore the State responsible by virtue of art 10(1) of the Dublin II 
Regulation.  
64 Tarakhel (n 1), para 114: 'the current situation in Italy can in no way be compared to 
the situation in Greece at the time of the M.S.S. judgment […] where the Court 
noted in particular that there were fewer than 1,000 places in reception centers to 
accommodate tens of thousands of asylum seekers and that the conditions of the 
most extreme poverty described by the applicant existed on a large scale.' 
65 ibid, para 114. 
66 ibid, para. 59. 
67 ibid, para 115.  
68 ibid, para 120. 
69 ibid, para 94.  
70 Chapman v. the UK App no 27238/95 (ECtHR, 18 January 2001), para 99. 
71 Müslim v. Turkey App no 53566/99 (ECtHR, 26 April 2005), para 85. 
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[finds] herself faced with official indifference in a situation of serious 
deprivation or want incompatible with human dignity.'72 
 
The applicants claimed that, during their stay in Italy (ten days before 
leaving for the Netherlands and hence to Switzerland), they were hosted in 
a reception center with poor hygiene conditions and without any privacy. 
Because of the specific situation of the applicants, a family with minor 
children,73 the Court found that Switzerland would have acted in breach of 
Article 3 of the Convention by repatriating them to Italy without 
obtaining assurances from the Italian authorities that on their arrival they 
would be received in facilities and in conditions adapted to the age of the 
children, and that the family would be kept together.74 
 
A more recent decision75 has confirmed that the individual situation of the 
applicants and not the general situation in Italy was the basis of the 
ECtHR findings in Tarakhel.76 The Court has in fact declared manifestly 
unfounded the application of an adult 'able young man with no 
dependents'.77 According to the Court, the applicant has not established 
that, if returned to Italy, he would face 'a sufficiently real and imminent 
risk of hardship severe enough to fall within the scope of Article 3.'78 This 
decision has explicitly acknowledged the principles laid down in Tarakhel,79 
but has come to a different conclusion in light of the individual situation 
of the applicant.  
 
In its Tarakhel judgment, the ECtHR clarified that the implementation of 
the Regulation may affect the protection of fundamental rights, and 
especially of the principle of non-refoulement set forth in Article 3 of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72 M.S.S. (n 2), paras 252-253; Budina v. Russia App no 45603/05 (ECtHR, 18 June 
2009).  
73 'The Court has established that it is important to bear in mind that the child's 
extreme vulnerability is the decisive factor and takes precedence over considerations 
relating to the status of illegal immigrant […]. Children have specific needs that are 
related in particular to their age and lack of independence, but also to their asylum-
seeker status.' See Tarakhel (n 1), para 99; Popov v. France App 
no 39472/07 and 39474/07 (ECtHR, 19 January 2012), para 91. 
74 ibid, para 120. 
75 A.M.E. v. the Netherlands App no 51428/10 (ECtHR, 5 February 2015). 
76 This was put into question in the joint partly dissenting opinion of judges 
Casadevall, Berro-Lefèvre and Jäderblom, who have argued that the Grand Chamber 
in Tarakhel departed 'from the Court's findings in numerous recent cases' and 
justified 'a reversal of [the Court] case-law within the space of a few months'. It 
would appear that the Tarakhel judgment relied on previous case-law, which also 
concerned the situation in Italy. Indeed, the ECtHR clearly stated that the reception 
conditions in Italy cannot in themselves act as a bar to the removal of asylum seekers 
to the Italian territory under the Dublin Regulation. Particular caution and 
additional requirements are nevertheless required when the return concerns 
vulnerable asylum seekers.  
77 ibid, para 34. 
78 ibid, para 36.  
79 ibid, paras 28 and 35.  
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Convention, in a number of cases which are not included in the CJEU 
interpretation. According to the CJEU, the criteria and mechanisms of the 
Dublin Regulation might be disapplied only in exceptional circumstances 
that essentially coincide with the collapse of a national protection system. 
Conversely, in the ECtHR jurisprudence, the presence of systemic failures 
is a sufficient, but not a necessary condition to rebut the presumption of 
compliance with fundamental rights. This means that, between the regular 
and lawful implementation of the Dublin Regulation and the collapse of a 
national system there are a number of circumstances that might 
compromise asylum seekers' rights.80 Member States shall take into due 
account all these circumstances in order to implement the Regulation in 
accordance with the ECHR as well as the EUCFR. 
 
4. The Interpretation of the CJEU Inconsistent with the EUCFR 
Article 4 EUCFR prohibits torture and other inhuman and degrading 
treatment and hence corresponds to Article 3 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights.81 In accordance with Article 52(3) of the Charter, the 
CJEU has interpreted this provision as implicitly stating the principle of 
non-refoulement. Nevertheless, in the Luxembourg jurisprudence, Article 4 
EUCFR seems to have a narrower meaning and scope than Article 3 
ECHR. As a matter of fact, according to the CJEU, Article 4 is to be 
interpreted as meaning that the Member States may not transfer an asylum 
seeker if they cannot be unaware of the systemic deficiencies in the 
protection system of the State responsible. Therefore, the Member States 
must consider the general situation in the receiving country to assess 
whether the repatriation of the asylum seeker is incompatible with the 
principle of non-refoulement proclaimed by Article 4 of the EU Charter. 
 
Conversely, according to the ECtHR jurisprudence, the individual 
circumstances of the applicants must be duly considered in assessing a 
potential violation of Article 3.82 The applicant's individual situation can be 
disregarded only if there is a generalized risk determined by widespread 
and systemic violations. As the Court has stated in M.S.S.,83 in such 
exceptional circumstances, it is implicitly proved that the applicant would 
be individually affected by a large-scale risk of inhuman and degrading 
treatment. The adoption of this approach in asylum seekers' claims 
extends beyond the field of application of the Dublin Regulation.84 This is 
likely to be the result of the EU asylum legislation's influence on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Steven Peers, 'Tarakhel v Switzerland: Another nail in the coffin of the Dublin 
system?' (2014) EU Law Analysis, 4 November 2014. 
81 See Explanations relating to arts 4 and 52(3) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 
Nonetheless, it should not pass unnoticed that the EU Charter explicitly proclaims 
the principle of non-refoulement in art 19, also corresponding to art 3 ECHR according 
to the Explanations. One might well wonder why the Court is so reticent concerning 
the applicability of this Charter provision. 
82 M.S.S. (n 2) para 219.  
83 M.S.S. (n 2) para 359. 
84 See, for instance, Sufi and Elmi v. UK, App no 8319/07 and 11449/07 (ECtHR, 28 
June 2011), para 293; and Saadi (n 37), para 132. 
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Strasbourg jurisprudence; suffice it to mention the Qualification Directive, 
which provides subsidiary protection to the civilian or the person whose 
life is seriously threatened by reason of indiscriminate violence.85  
 
An interpretation in accordance with Article 52(3) EUCFR would consider 
the 'systemic failures' criterion86 adopted by the CJEU not as a threshold 
under which there is no potential violation of Article 4, but rather as a 
condition that might exempt the asylum seeker from proving his/her 
individual risk.87   
 
In light of the case law of the EU Court, the scope of Article 4 of the 
Charter, proclaiming the prohibition of torture, is narrower than that of 
Article 3 ECHR in so far as the application of the former provision is not 
triggered in the presence of an individual risk. Moreover, the high 
threshold established by the CJEU to rebut the mutual trust principle, 
which is based on Article 4 of the Charter, may affect human rights and 
fundamental freedoms as recognized by the Convention, in breach of 
Article 53 of the Charter. As a matter of fact, the repatriation of the 
Tarakhel family to Italy, perfectly compatible with Article 4 EUCFR as 
interpreted by the CJEU, would have amounted to a breach of Article 3 
ECHR. A revirement in the CJEU jurisprudence is, therefore, sorely needed 
in order to ensure an interpretation of Article 4 of the Charter compatible 
with the clauses set forth by Articles 52 and 53 of the same Charter and to 
prevent further litigation.88 Nevertheless, a spontaneous 'adjustment'89 in 
the jurisprudence of the CJEU seems to be highly unlikely in light of the 
recent statements of the CJEU in the Opinion 2/2013, concerning the 
accession of the EU to the ECHR. Interestingly, this Opinion was 
delivered only a few weeks after the Tarakhel judgment of the ECtHR. It 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Art 15(c) of the Directive. This provision was interpreted by the CJEU as meaning 
that the more generalized is the risk, the less the person who claims protection must 
demonstrate an individual risk; C-465/07, Elgafaji v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie [2009] 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:94. 
86 For an analysis of the genesis and the rationale of this criterion (whose scope 
extends beyond the implementation of the Dublin system) vis-à-vis the mutual trust 
principle, see Armin Von Bogdandy, John Ioannidis, 'Systemic Deficiency in the 
Rule of Law: What It Is, What Has Been Done, What Can Be Done' (2014) 51 
Common Market Law Review 59. 
87 Cathryn Costello, 'Dublin-case NS/ME: Finally, an end to blind trust across the 
EU?' (2012) 2 A&MR 83, 89. This interpretation is adopted by the UK Supreme 
Court in EM (Eritrea), 19 February 2014: '[v]iolation of Article 3 does not require (or, 
at least, does not necessarily require) that the complained of conditions said to 
constitute inhuman or degrading conditions are the product of systemic 
shortcomings' (para 42). This judgment has strongly influenced the ECtHR decision 
in Tarakhel (n 1, para 104).  
88 Guy Goodwin-Gill 'Budeserepublik Deutschland v. Kaveh Puid (E.C.J.) [notes]' 
(2014) 53 International Legal Materials 341. 
89 Claire Vial, 'La méthode d'ajustement de la Cour de justice de l'Union 
européenne : quand indépendance rime avec équivalence' in Caroline Picheral, 
Laurent Coutron (eds), Charte des droits fondamentaux de l'Union européenne et Convention 
européenne des droits de l'homme (Bruylant 2012), 93.   
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clearly emerges from the Opinion that the CJEU is reluctant to permit 
external interferences in its field of competence, especially when these 
interferences are deemed to threaten the primacy and autonomy of EU 
law.  
 
The interpretative divergences between the European courts are to be read 
in light of the broader tension, raised by the Opinion in question, between 
the autonomy and the primacy of EU law and fundamental human rights. 
The fundamental importance of the mutual trust principle in EU law, 
which allows for the creation and the maintenance of an area without 
internal borders,90 excludes the possibility for Member States to 'check 
whether [another] Member State has actually, in a specific case, observed 
the fundamental rights guaranteed by the EU.'91 This clearly offers a 
justification for the approach adopted by the CJEU in Abdullahi, which 
excludes the relevance of the individual risk faced by an applicant. As a 
result, for the sake of protecting the mutual trust principle, the CJEU 
seems to have created a new principle of non-refoulement which only applies 
to intra-EU removals. The violation of this principle is only triggered when 
a Member State, to which an individual has to be returned, suffers from 
systemic deficiencies that make it highly likely (if not certain) that he/she 
would face inhuman and degrading treatment upon return. This intra-EU 
principle of non-refoulement is clearly different and less protective than the 
one inferred by the ECtHR from Article 3 of the Convention. 
Consequently, insofar as the Bosphorus equivalent protection presumption 
is not applicable to Dublin removals, the Member State acting in 
accordance with this newly created principle of non-refoulement remains 
exposed to ECtHR scrutiny. 
 
IV. COMPOSING THE ECTHR AND THE CJEU JURISPRUDENCE 
ON STATE OBLIGATIONS 
 
Separate from the conditions to rebut the presumption of compliance is 
the question of the consequences deriving from the rebuttal of such 
presumption. This final section focuses on the obligations of the Member 
States having jurisdiction over an asylum seeker whose application shall be 
examined, according to the Dublin Regulation criteria, by another 
Member State that does not comply with the EU asylum legislation. This 
analysis aims to assess, firstly, whether the obligations imposed on the 
Member States by the CJEU are compatible with the ECHR and, 
secondly, whether the obligation introduced by the ECtHR in Tarakhel, to 
request and obtain diplomatic assurances from the State responsible under 
the Dublin Regulation, can be reconciled with the mutual trust principle. 
 
1. The Twofold Obligation Set Forth by the CJEU Compatible with the ECHR 
In M.S.S., the ECtHR imposed on the Contracting States a general 
obligation of abstention from returning an asylum seeker to the competent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Opinion 2/2013 (n 30), para 191; see also N.S. (n 3), para 83.  
91 Opinion 2/2013 (n 30), para 192.  
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State when there are substantial grounds for believing that, if returned, 
he/she would face the risk of inhuman and degrading treatments. In 
addition, the reference to the sovereignty clause set forth by Article 3(2) of 
the Regulation (now Article 17(1) of the Recast), has been interpreted as 
imposing on the returning State a duty to examine the asylum 
application.92 It is, nonetheless, unlikely that the Strasbourg Court 
intended to impose such an obligation. As mentioned above, the ECHR 
provisions do not explicitly protect the right to asylum. The Contracting 
States act in compliance with the ECHR insofar as the asylum seekers 
under their jurisdiction enjoy the fundamental rights set forth by this 
Convention. These rights do not include the right to apply for asylum. A 
different interpretation would merely be 'wishful legal thinking'.93  
 
In the N.S. case, the CJEU precisely defined the content of the obligation 
of the States having jurisdiction over an asylum seeker who cannot be 
repatriated to the State responsible under the Dublin Regulation. This is 
meant to be a twofold obligation.  
 
Firstly, the Member State, faced with systematic failures in the State 
identified as competent, must continue to examine the criteria set forth in 
the Dublin Regulation 'in order to establish whether one of these criteria 
enables another Member State to be identified as responsible for the 
examination of the asylum application.'94 One might argue that the 
interpretation of the CJEU is inconsistent with the principle laid down in 
M.S.S. by the ECtHR for providing the States with an alternative means to 
escape from the examination of the asylum application. Nonetheless, 
provided that the return to another State identified as competent on the 
basis of alternative Dublin criteria does not trigger a risk of violation of 
Article 3 ECHR, the additional obligation conceived by the CJEU seems 
perfectly compatible with the Convention. Again, the ECHR provisions 
do not explicitly protect the right to apply for asylum, but only prevent the 
asylum seeker from being repatriated to a country in which he/she would 
face inhuman and degrading treatment. The expulsion of the asylum seeker 
to a Member State that does not respect and protect the fundamental 
rights guaranteed by the EU is explicitly prohibited by the CJEU.95 If the 
latter Court acknowledged that the individual risk faced by a specific 
applicant might also rebut the compliance presumption, the protection 
from his/her expulsion to the noncompliant Member State would in 
principle suffice to ensure the observance of the ECHR. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 See inter alia Giuseppe Morgese, 'Regolamento Dublino II e applicazione del 
principio di mutua fiducia tra Stati membri: la pronunzia della Corte di giustizia nel 
caso N.S. e altri' (2012) Studi sull'integrazione europea 158.  
93 Kay Hailbronner, 'Nonrefoulement and "Humanitarian" Refugees: Customary 
International Law or Wishful Legal Thinking?', in David Martin (ed), The New 
Asylum Seekers: Refugee Law in the 1980s (International Studies in Human Rights 
Series, Springer 1988) 
94  Case C-411/10 and 493/10 (n 3), para 107 
95 ibid, paras 94 and 106.  
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Secondly, according to the CJEU and only as a subsidiary means, where it 
is impossible to identify another State competent according to the Dublin 
criteria or where such an identification procedure would be excessively 
detrimental to the asylum seeker, the State must exercise the sovereignty 
clause and proceed to the assessment of the asylum claim.96 Nonetheless, 
in response to a preliminary ruling introduced by a German judge, the 
Luxembourg Court has argued that no obligation for the Member States to 
examine an asylum claim can be inferred from Article 3(2) of the 
Regulation.97 In the Puid case, the CJEU clarified that the competence of 
the State having jurisdiction over the asylum seeker derives from Article 13 
of the Dublin II Regulation (corresponding to Article 3(2) of the Recast 
Regulation).98 This provision, in fact, established that '[w]here no Member 
State responsible for examining the application for asylum can be 
designated on the basis of the criteria listed in this Regulation, the first 
Member State with which the application for asylum was lodged shall be 
responsible for examining it.' By virtue of Article 13, the State having 
jurisdiction over the asylum seeker, being the Member State in which the 
application was lodged, became the State responsible for examining the 
asylum claim. The transfer of competence to the returning State in 
presence of systemic flaws in the Member State identified as competent by 
virtue of the Dublin criteria is now codified by Article 3(2) of the Dublin 
III Regulation, which entered into force in January 2014. This obligation 
is, nonetheless, conditional on the impossibility of identifying another 
State competent on the basis of the Regulation criteria.   
 
The findings of the CJEU in Puid were based on the assumption that the 
Dublin Regulation does not confer individual rights on the asylum seekers, 
but only regulates the sharing of competence among the Member States.99 
The Luxembourg Court has answered in the negative the preliminary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 ibid, para 108: 'The Member State in which the asylum seeker is present must, 
however, ensure that it does not worsen a situation where the fundamental rights of 
that applicant have been infringed by using a procedure for determining the Member 
State responsible which takes an unreasonable length of time. If necessary, the first 
mentioned Member State must itself examine the application in accordance with the 
procedure laid down in Article 3(2) of Regulation No 343/2003.' 
97 Case C-4/14, Bundesrepublik Deutschland v. Kaveh Puid [2013] ECLI:EU:C:2013:740, 
para 37. See also the Opinion of AG Jääskinen in this case (n 55), para 70: 'a 
substantive obligation on the Member State in which the application for asylum was 
first lodged cannot be derived from the first sentence of Article 3(2). This provision 
clearly aims at permitting any Member State with which an application for asylum 
has been lodged to take the position of the Member State responsible in accordance 
with its sovereign discretion. This might be done, for example, for political, practical 
or humanitarian reasons. In other words, this provision authorizes, but does not 
compel, the Member States to examine asylum applications' (footnotes omitted). 
98 ibid, para 36.  
99 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in Puid (n 55), paras 58, 59 and 73. See also 
Opinion of AG Trstenjak in Case C-620/10 Kastrati [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:10, para 
29: 'the objective of Regulation No 343/2003 is not to create procedural safeguards 
for asylum seekers in terms of the determination of conditions for the acceptance or 
rejection of their asylum applications.' 
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question raised by the German judge: there is no judicially enforceable 
claim, in the hands of asylum seekers, to compel a Member State to 
examine their applications for asylum based on a duty of that Member 
State to exercise its competence pursuant to Article 3(2) of the Dublin II 
Regulation. As argued above, an obligation to examine an asylum claim is 
not even inferable from the ECHR provisions. Therefore, the 
interpretation of the Regulation proposed by the CJEU is not 
incompatible with the Convention, a fortiori in light of the Recast 
Regulation that explicitly imposes on the Member State the duty to assess 
the application of the asylum seeker who cannot be repatriated to the 
Member State competent.100 
 
From this perspective, insofar as the future case law of the CJEU will 
acknowledge that the individual risk suffered by an asylum seeker might 
rebut the compliance presumption, the EU legislation is likely to offer a 
more extensive protection than the ECHR.  
 
2. Diplomatic Assurances and Mutual Trust: An Alternative Reading of the 
Tarakhel Judgment  
Concerning the findings of the Strasbourg Court in Tarakhel, as far as 
there is an agreement on the existence of a wide range of circumstances 
which might entail a risk of inhuman and degrading treatment under 
Article 3 ECHR (besides the extreme hypothesis of the dramatic collapse 
of a national protection system), it should not be surprising that the 
content of States' obligation varies depending on the seriousness of this 
risk. 
 
As mentioned above, the Strasbourg Court claims that, though not acting 
as a bar to all removals of asylum seekers to Italy, the conditions of the 
Italian protection system might entail the risk of inhuman and degrading 
treatment for the applicants.101 Hence, the circumstance that the Italian 
system, unlike the Greek one, does not suffer from systemic deficiencies 
undoubtedly excludes an automatic suspension of the 'Dublin returns' to 
Italy but, at the same time, is likely to alter the regular application of the 
Regulation. The lesser seriousness of the shortcomings in the Italian 
reception system allows for the formulation of a 'softer obligation': no 
examination of the asylum claim or exercise of the sovereignty clause is 
demanded in this case. Nonetheless, the transfer to Italy is conditional: 'it 
is […] incumbent on the Swiss authorities to obtain assurances from their 
Italian counterparts that on their arrival in Italy the applicants will be 
received in facilities and in conditions adapted to the age of the children, 
and that the family will be kept together.'102 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100 Even if such obligation remained conditional to the impossibility to identify 
another State competent on the basis of the Regulation criteria.   
101 Tarakhel (n 1), para 120. 
102 ibid, para 120. 
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According to the ECtHR, such assurances must consist of sufficiently 
detailed individual guaranties. The Court considered insufficient the intent 
expressed by the Italian authorities103 to allocate the family in an ERF 
funded reception center in Bologna.104 This approach is consistent with 
the previous case law of the Court. In particular, in the M.S.S. judgment 
the ECtHR denied the validity of agreements formulated in vague and 
stereotyped terms without mentioning individual guarantees based on the 
applicant's situation.105  
 
The Court has failed to provide definitive indications concerning the 
substantial and formal requirements that these assurances must meet to be 
considered reliable. Interestingly, the ECtHR has omitted any reference to 
its previous case law on diplomatic assurances.106 Therefore, the respect of 
the principle of non-refoulement in implementing the Dublin Regulation 
continues to largely fall within the realm of the Member States' discretion.  
 
The key question is nonetheless whether this 'soft' obligation to obtain 
diplomatic assurances is compatible with the principle of mutual trust. As 
the CJEU has recently claimed in its opinion on the EU accession to the 
European Convention on Human Rights, 'when implementing EU law, the 
Member States may, under EU law, be required to presume that 
fundamental rights have been observed by the other Member States, so 
that […], save in exceptional cases, they may not check whether that other 
Member State has actually, in a specific case, observed the fundamental 
rights guaranteed by the EU.'107 Therefore, one may well argue that the 
request for diplomatic assurances, if automatized, might be in breach of 
the mutual trust principle.108 Nevertheless, when diplomatic assurances are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 The Italian declaration was referred to the Court by the Swiss government during 
the hearing (para 75 of the judgment).  
104 ibid, para 121. 
105 M.S.S. (n 2), para 354. Moreover, in this judgment the Court argued that, in order 
to be reliable and to produce effects, the assurances must be obtained before the 
repatriation of the asylum seeker is disposed (and not only previous to its execution).  
106 Suffice it to mention the judgment of the ECtHR in Saadi v. Italy (n 37) in which 
the Court has indicated a number of requirements, such as the reliability of the 
authorities issuing the assurances and the assessment of the general human rights 
conditions in the territory of destination. For an overview on these criteria see Alice 
Izumo, 'Diplomatic Assurances against Torture and Ill Treatment: European Court 
of Human Rights Jurisprudence' (2010) 42 Columbia Human Rights Law Review 233. 
One might nonetheless argue that the criteria set forth in Saadi, a case involving a 
risk of torture, are too demanding for the 'Dublin Returns', which are intra-EU 
repatriations supported, though not in absolute terms, by the principle of mutual 
trust between the Member States.   
107 Opinion 2/2013 (n 30), para 192. The risk that, following the accession, the respect 
of the ECHR would demand a systematic check of other Member States' compliance 
with fundamental rights makes the Court concluding that 'accession is liable to upset 
the underlying balance of the EU and undermine the autonomy of EU law' (para 194).  
108 See also Opinion of AG Jääskinen, in Puid (n 55), para 62: 'the principle of mutual 
trust may not be placed under question through systematic examination, in each 
procedure entailing an application for asylum, of the compliance of other Member 
States with their obligations under the Common European Asylum System.' 
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requested and obtained, the application of the Dublin Regulation is only 
conditional and not impeded, as it might be in presence of systemic 
failures. Moreover, the exchange of assurances might be seen as an 
enforcement of the principle of cooperation which underlies the Dublin 
Regulation.109 
 
In a way, these considerations bring to mind the M.S.S. judgment. It seems 
indeed that the ECtHR, as it did in M.S.S., is suggesting to the EU an 
interpretation of the Dublin Regulation, which would be capable of 
ensuring the compatibility of its implementation with the ECHR without 
sacrificing the mutual trust presumption. The EU would certainly feel 
more comfortable to undertake a jurisprudential shift aimed at granting 
the respect of Articles 52 and 53 of the Charter if this shift did not put the 
mutual trust principle in danger. Indeed, imposing on Member States a 
'soft' obligation to obtain diplomatic assurances, in cases in which an 
asylum seeker would face an individual risk upon return to an EU Member 
State, is a small price to pay in order to save the implementation of EU 
asylum policy from the ECtHR scrutiny.  
 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This paper was dedicated to an analysis of the divergences between the 
CJEU and the ECtHR jurisprudence concerning the implementation of 
the Dublin Regulation. The analysis has shown that the CJEU approach, 
which is justified by the protection of the mutual trust principle in EU law, 
is in breach of the clauses set forth by Articles 52 and 53 of the EUCFR 
and exposes the Member States to the judicial scrutiny by the ECtHR, as 
the Tarakhel case clearly showed. One may argue that the CJEU has 
reshaped the principle of non-refoulement for intra-EU removals by stating 
that the mutual trust principle can only be rebutted in the presence of 
systemic deficiencies, therefore excluding any relevance for the individual 
risk faced by an asylum seeker. 
 
In Tarakhel, the ECtHR has proposed an interpretation which enables 
Member States to implement the Dublin Regulation in accordance with 
the ECHR and the EUCFR. By assuming the existence of a wide range of 
circumstances which might entail a risk of inhuman and degrading 
treatment under Article 3 ECHR (besides the extreme hypothesis of the 
dramatic collapse of a national protection system), the ECtHR made the 
content of the state obligation dependent on the seriousness of the risk 
faced by the applicant. In the presence of systemic failures, which make it 
highly likely (if not certain) that the applicant would face inhuman and 
degrading treatment in the State competent, the Member States cannot 
return the applicant to this country. In cases in which the risk of inhuman 
and degrading treatment is not proven by the general situation in the State 
competent, but is instead motivated by individual circumstances, a softer 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Marchegiani (n 60), 1114.  
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obligation lays on Member States: that of obtaining from the receiving 
country assurances that the applicant will be taken in charge in adequate 
reception conditions and will have access to a fair and efficient asylum 
procedure.  
 
This interpretation ensures compliance with both mutual trust and the 
non-refoulement principle and therefore represents a workable way for the 
EU to implement its common asylum policy in conformity with the 
EUCFR provisions. 
